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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This document is the final report for the Clearfield disassembly evaluation and a continuation
of the KSC postflight assessment for the 360T025 (STS-46) RSRM flight set. All observed
hardware conditionSwere documented on PFORsand are included in Appendices A through
C. Appendices D and E contain the measurements and safety factor data for the nozzle and
insulation components. This report, along with the KSC Ten-Day Postflight Hardware
Evaluation Report (TWR-60687), represents a summary of the 360T025 hardware
evaluation. The as-flown hardware configuration is documented in TWR-60470.
Disassembly evaluation photograph numbers are logged in TWA-1986.
The 360T025 flight set disassembly evaluations described in this document were performed at
the RSRM Refurbishment Facility in Clearfield, Utah. The final factory joint demate
occurred on 16 March 1993.
Detailed evaluations were performed in accordance with the Clearfield PEEP, TWR-50051,
Revision A. All observations were compared against limits that are also defined in the PEEE
These limits outline the criteria for categorizing the observations as acceptable, reportable,
or critical. Hardware conditions that were unexpected and/or determined to be reportable or
critical were evaluated by the applicable CPT and tracked through the PFAR system.
Figure 1 shows the RSRM Case Configuration.
Factory Joint Factory Joint Factory Joint /-- Factory Joint --_
- F°rwar_lSegment" "It Forward Cenl;er Segment" _ Aft Cent_" Segment" _ _--Aft Sei'ment" ._1_1- -_1-_
L Forward Field Joint Field Joint Field Joint --/ Attach Stiffener Stiffener Dom eDome
*Casting Segments
Figure 1. Case Configuration
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2.0 REFERENCES
The following documents are referenced herein:
CPWl-3600A Prime Equipment Contract End Item Detail Specification, Part I of Two
Parts; Performance, Design, and Verification Requirements, Space
Shuttle Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor CPWI-3600A For Space
Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Project, Operational Flight Motors
(RSRM-4 and subsequent)
TWA-1986 360T025, STS-46, Clearfield Postflight Photo Log
TWR-50050 KSC Postflight Engineering Evaluation Plan (PEEP)
TWR-50051 Clearfield Postflight Engineering Evaluation Plan (PEEP)
TWR-60639 Postflight Hardware Special Issues, 360T025 (STS-46), Clearfield
TWR-60470 STS-46, RSRM-025, 360T025, KSC Processing Configuration and Data
Report
TWR-60687 KSC Ten-Day Postflight Hardware Evaluation Report, 360T025
(STS-46)
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3.0 EVALUATION SUMMARY
Table I provides a summary of all postflight-related Squawks/Preliminary PFARs, PFARs,
IFAs, and SPRs for 360T025.
KSC
Clearfield
Total
Table I. Summary of 360T025 Problems
Squawks/Prelim, PFAR_ PFARs IFAs SPRs
15 7 0 0
10 _2 O O
25 10 0 0
A description of all 360T025 problems is included in Table II. This includes PFARs, Squawks
(written at KSC) and Preliminary PFARs (written at Clearfield) that were written and not
elevated to PFARs. All preliminary PFARs are discussed in Section 4.0 of this document.
Information relating to postflight Squawks can be found in TWR-60687.
3.1 CEI Specification Compliance
Based on hardware evaluations at KSC and Clearfield, as defined in the respective PEEPs
(TWR-50050, Revision C and TWR-50051, Revision A), all CEI (CPWI-3600A) motor
performance requirements were met.
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4.0 COMPONENT EVALUATIONS
The following sections detail, by component, the hardware condition observed at Clearfield.
4.1 Insulation
Internal insulation evaluations of the igniters, case acreage, joints, and liners are summarized
in the following sections. PFORs documenting the observations are found in Appendix A.
Only the RH motor was evaluated as specified in the Clearfield PEEP.
4.1.1 Thermal Performance Evaluation
Summaries of the safety factors for the nozzle-to-case joint, field joint, factory joint, case
acreage and igniter insulation are found in Tables III through VII, respectively. All safety
factors for these areas can be found in Appendix E, Tables E-I through E-XI. All joint
insulation regions, including factory joints, must meet a minimum safety factor of 2.0. A
minimum safety factor of 1.5 is required in the acreage insulation regions. The igniter
insulation forward of the igniter nozzle insert (Station 5), requires a minimum remaining
insulation thickness of 0.010 inch.
Preliminary PFAR 46C-10 was written for apparent CSF violations on the RH aft center
segment (see Table IV). The apparent violations occurred at the factory joint (161.4 inch
station) which has a history of providing inaccurate prefire data. The 161.4 inch station will be
replaced by the 163.0 inch station effective RSRM-31. All other safety factors were within
CEI specification limits. All thermal protection requirements were met.
4.1.2 Internal Insulation Samples
Removal of internal insulation samples was not required on 360T025 per the Clearfield
PEEP.
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Table III. Summary of 360T025 Nozzle-to-Case Joint and Field Joint Insulation
Safety Factors
Nozzle-to-Case Joint RH
Min. Compliance Min. Actual
Safety Factor Safety Factor
(CS_ * Degree Location (ASF) * De2ree Location
4.0 0.0 4.5 0.0
Aft Field Joint, RH 4.8 316.0 5.1 316.0
Center Field Joint, RH 9.9 46.0 10.6 46.0
Forward Field Joint, RH 13.9 136.0 14.8 136.0
* Minimum required joint insulation safety factor is 2.0.
Table IV. Summary of 360T025 Factory Joint Insulation Safety Factors
Min.
Station Compliance Safety Degree
Joint (inche_) Factor (CSF3 * Location
Aft Dome/ 56.0 3.55 180.0
Stiffener, RH
Stiffener/ 177.7 2.44 136.8
Stiffener, RH
Stiffener/ET 299.1 2.83 136.8
Attach, RH
Aft Center, 161.4 1.21"* 46.0
RH
Forward Center, 161.4 4.21 316.0
RH
ForwardCylinder/ 162.0 4.02 90.0
Cylinder, RH
Forward Dome/ 321.0 3.67 286.0
Cylinder, RH
Min. Actual Safety
Factor (ASF3 *
4.37
3.76
4.56
3.54
10.32
5.59
3.87
Degree
Location
180.0
136.8
136.8
46.0
316.0
90.0
286.0
Minimum required joint insulation safety factor is 2.0.
Preliminary PFAR 46C-10 written on apparent CSF violations.
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Table V. Summary of 360T025 Case Acreage Insulation Safety Factors
Aft Dome, RH
Aft, RH
Aft Center, RH
Forward Ctr., RH
Forward, RH
Min. Min. Actual
Compliance Safety Station Degree Safety Factor Station
Factor (CSF) * finches) Location (ASF) * (inches)
2.16 45.0 226.8 2.30 45.0
2.15 158.5 226.8 2.19 158.5
2.31 163.0 0.0 2.78 30.7
3.78 71.5 46.0 4.29 71.5
1.91 371.0 90.0 2.41 187.0
Degree
Location
226.8
226.8
46.0
46.0
154.0
Minimum required case acreage insulation safety factor is 1.5.
Table VI. Summary of 360T025 Igniter Insulation Safety Factors
Min. Min. Actual
Compliance Safety Degree Safety Factor
Factor (CSID * Station _ (ASF) * Station
Degree
L0¢ati0n
LH Igniter 2.75 3
Chamber OD
RH Igniter 2.65 2
Chamber OD
LH Igniter 4.01 7
Chamber ID
RH Igniter 8.69 9
Chamber ID
LH Adapter 2.37 11
RH Adapter 2.79 11
LH Inner Joint 5.69 10
RH Inner Joint 5.87 10
LH Outer Joint 3.86 1
RH Outer Joint 3.47 **
330.0 2.93 3
330.0 3.02 2
270.0 4.28 7
150.0 9.93 9
90.0 2.83 11
240.0 3.33 11
270.0 6.19 10
150.0 6.48 10
0.0 4.43 1
286.0 3.95 **
330.0
330.0
270.0
150.0
90.0
240.0
270.O
150.0
90.0
286.0
Minimum required safety factors are 1.5 for the chamber and adapter acreage and
2.0 for the igniter joints.
Minimum compliance safety factor was located on forward dome side of the outer
joint at the 403 inch station location.
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Table VII. Summary of 360T025 Igniter Insulation at Station 5
Minimum
Postflight Degree
Station Thickness * Location
Igniter, LH 5 0.063 240.0
Igniter, RH 5 0.069 330.0
• Minimum required thickness is 0.010 inch at Station 5.
4.1.3 Liner
Detailed liner maps are included in Appendix A. The remaining liner patterns were typical of
past flight motors.
4.1.4 Igniter Nozzle Insert
LH
The postflight igniter nozzle insert throat diameter measurements were 6.362 inches at 0
degrees, 6.432 inches at 60 degrees, and 6.436 inches at 120 degrees. Using the maximum
postfire measurement provides a thermal factor of safety of 7.8.
RH
The postflight igniter nozzle insert throat diameter measurements were 6.356 inches at 0
degrees, 6.359 inches at 60 degrees, and 6.399 inches at 120 degrees. Using the maximum
postfire measurement provides a thermal factor of safety of 8.5.
4.1.5 Results of Special Issues and Concerns (Internal Insulation)
TWR-60639 identified areas for special evaluation of 360T025 at Clearfield.
1. Condition: Prior to casting of the RH aft segment, moisture was introduced into the
vacuum bell and was evident on the core and casting dam. The liner in the
segment was also exposed to this same environment.
Results: The performance of the aft segment insulation was compared to the RSRM
database to determine if any significant increased erosion of the insulation
was experienced due to possible failure of the liner system. The aft segment
insulation performance was well within the RSRM database. No significant
increased insulation erosion was noted. The aft segment insulation
performance tables are included in Appendix E.
DOeNO. _R-6069_ Iv°L
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2. Condition: Pattern labels (Type FSX-11) lost during insulation layup are potentially
included in the rubber of RSRM-25 RH forward segment.
Results: No foreign material .was noted during the postrinse internal insulation
evaluation of the forward segment.
4.1.6 Results of Special Issues and Concerns (External Insulation)
TWR-60639 identified one area for special evaluation of 360T025 at Clearfield.
1. Condition: Three areas of cork were missing from the LH center forward GEI cork run
on RSRM-24, The potential exists for localized unbonded areas on
RSRM-25 cork runs.
Results: Over 20 feet of GEI cork runs were removed from four segments (minimum
of four feet from four different runs on four different segments) for bondline
evaluation. All of the cork removed was well bonded. Results are
documented in Appendix A on PFOR clarification form, pg. A-13.
4.2 Case. Seals. and Joints
Seal and joint evaluations of the S&As, factory joints, internal nozzle joints, ports, and port
plugs were performed. PFORs documenting the observations are found in Appendix B.
4.2.1 S&As
Figure 2 shows the Safe and Arm device (S&A) configuration. The S&As were disassembled
on 13 August 1992 at the Clearfield H-5 facility.
No anomalous conditions were Observed. Typical galling was observed on each B-B housing
land between the SII primary and secondary seal surfaces. The galling was acceptable since it
did not exceed 0.020 inch in depth (non-sealing surface).
Typical soot was observed up to, but not past, the forward primary rotor shaft O-ring of both
S&As_ No O-ring or seal surface damage was observed.
4.2.2 Factory Joints
The factory joints were inspected by Quality Assurance at Clearfield. All fourteen factory
joints were in good condition with no heavy corrosion on any of the joints. No O-ring heat
effects or erosion were observed.
4.2.3 Internal Nozzle Joints
Details can be found in Section 4.3.
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PRIMARY SEAL
ROTOR SHAFT
PRIMARY SEALS
SEALS
TEFLON
ROTOR SHAFT
SECONDARY SEALS
SRM IGNITION
INITIATOR Figure 2. Safe and Arm Device Configuration
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4.2.4 Ports and Port Plugs
All plug breakaway and running torques were nominal and are documented on applicable
PFORs in Appendix B.
_&As
No anomalous conditions were observed on any of the S&Aleak check ports, plugs, SII ports,
SIIs, or O-rings.
Factory. Joint_
No anomalous conditions were observed on any of the factory joint leak check ports, plugs, or
!
O-rings.
Internal Noz.z.]_ Joints
No anomalous conditions were observed on any of the internal nozzle joint leak check ports,
plugs, or O-rings.
4.2.5 Results of Special Issues and Concerns (Case, Seals, and Joints)
TWR-60639 identified areas for special evaluation of 360T025 at Clearfield. The case, seals,
and joint issues are listed below with their respective results.
1. Condition: Beginning with RSRM-23, the case factory joints were returned to standard
1U51899-04 shims (0.034 inch thick) configuration instead of custom shims
(variable thickness). Because RSRM-23 was delayed, RSRM-25 was the
second motor set to use the standard shims. This change was implemented
to reduce factory joint fretting.
Results: Light fretting was noted on LH aft center factory joint. However, because a
specific evaluation for fretting was not included on all individual
joint PFORs, it is not known whether the evaluation was performed on all
joints.
2. Condition: Current O-rings on SRM Igniter Initiator (SIII) were replaced with
improved dimensionally controlled O-rings (P/N 1U50228-47).
Results: No damage was observed to the SII secondary O-rings (P/N 1U50228-47)
of each S&A.
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3. Condition: The nozzle fixed housing forward end bolt chamfers and spotfaces have
previously been affected by the glass beading operation during
refurbishment. Material was deformed or removed from the edge of the
chamfer. This condition may exist on this flight set and could compromise
the Packing with Retainer seal if defects also exist on the Packing with
Retainer and on the fixed housing spotface at corresponding locations.
Results:
4. Condition:
No metal damage or rounded chamfers were observed on the bolt through
hole spotfaces of either nozzle.
A recent seals audit identified discrepancies between the Refurbishment
and process finalization specifications (STW7-3434 and STW7-3450,
respectively) and Engineering requirement drawings. The specifications do
not provide adequate criteria for the throat support housing forward and aft
seal surfaces of nozzle Joints 3 and 4.
Results: Joint _-RH - Light-to-medium corrosion was noted on the housing
intermittent full circumference. No other corrosion or metal damage was
noted.
,loint; 4-RH - Light corrosion was noted adjacent to but not in the footprint
on the forward exit cone (corrosion was heavy at 230-255 degrees).
Light-to-medium corrosion with pitting was noted on the throat seal
surface from 162-200 degrees (corrosion was heavy at 250-251 degrees).
The deepest pit was 0.002 inch.
Joint 3-LH - Light-to-medium corrosion was noted on the housing
intermittent full circumference. No other corrosion or metal damage was
noted.
Joint 4-LH- Light-to-medium intermittent corrosion was noted on the aft
surface of the throat support hosuing. No metal damage was noted on the
throat support housing forward and aft seal surfaces with the following
exceptions: Burnishing on the throat forward seal surface at 130 degrees
(0.1 inch circumferential X 0.1 inch radial) and 133 degrees 10.63
circumferential X 0.1 inch radial)
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4.3 Nozzle
Figure 3 defines the internal joint nomenclature and details the internal nozzle joint
configuration used in this report. Also shown in Figure 3 are the materials used in the nozzle.
The internal nozzle joints were disassembled on 14-18 August 1992 at the Clearfield H-6
facility.
The condition of the 360T025 nozzle internal joints was generally typical of previous flight
nozzles. RTV was below the char line in all joints except Joint 3 on the RH nozzle where gas
penetrated the joint RTV in one area. The primary and secondary O-rings in all joints showed
no signs of blowby, erosion, heat effects, or disassembly damage.
Metal damage due to disassembly or handling was found on the LH aft exit cone and RH fixed
housing. The RH nozzle assembly shifted during transportation resulting in light scratches
and displaced metal on the aft end of the fixed housing flange (forward face). Preliminary
PFAR 46C-01 was written against this condition. Two areas of metal damage were found on
the aft exit cone assembly. The first area was located on the compliance ring OD at 198
degrees. The damage measured 0.080 inch circumferential, extending 0.090 inch aft of the
top of the compliance ring, with an approximate depth of 0.120 inch. The second area
consisted of a rounded corner of the forward OD edge of the exitcone shell. The area was
located from 330-340 degrees measuring approximately 0.070 inch axial. Preliminary PFAR
46C-09 was written as a result of these conditions.
The following sections provide detailed assessments of nozzle internal joints, bondlines, char
and erosion performance, flex boot, bearing protector, and flex bearing performance, and
throat erosion data. The outcome of special issues and concerns for this nozzle flight set is
also presented. PFORs documenting the observations are found in Appendix B and C.
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Figure 3. Internal Nozzle Joint Configuration
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4.3.1 Nose Inlet/Forward End Ring/Cowl (Joint 2)
LH
No anomalous conditions were observed. Typical scalloped shaped soot was observed full
circumference. Soot reached the primary O-ring at 44-46, 162-174, 198-228 and 272-274
degrees. No O-ring or seal surface damage was observed.
There was typical mixing of RTV and adhesive with the RTV below the char line over the
complete circumference. Typical soot entered the joint between layers of RTV and adhesive.
Soot and light corrosion reached the bolt circle intermittently around the full circumference.
Grease coverage on the joint metal surfaces was nominal. No excessive grease was found in
the bolt holes. Medium-to-heavy corrosion was present on the forward end chamfer area of
the cowl housing intermittent full circumference. There was also light corrosion on the OD of
the forward mounting face of the cowl housing full circumference. The forward end ring
flange OD had intermittent light-to-medium corrosion in areas where the paint was chipped
or missing but there was no evidence of heat effects. There was also light-to-medium
corrosion on the forward end ring flange mounting face and nose inlet ID surface but did not
extend into the O-ring footprints.
No separations were observed on the nose inlet assembly or cowl assembly.
RH
No anomalous conditions were observed. Typical scalloped shaped soot was observed full
circumference. Soot reached the bolt circle and primary O-ring at 56-60, 150-156 and
218-222 degrees, but did not go past the footprint. No O-ring or seal surface damage was
observed.
There was typical mixing of RTV and adhesive with the RTV below the char line over the
complete circumference. Typical soot entered the joint between layers of RTV and adhesive.
A terminated gas path was found within the RTV at 320 degrees. It did not extend to the metal
housing.
Grease coverage on the joint metal surfaces was nominal. No excessive grease was found in
the bolt holes. Intermittent light corrosion was located on the forward end chamfer of the
cowl housing. Medium corrosion was found at 255-340 degrees on the cowl ID with
intermittent light corrosion existing on the remaining circumference. The forward end ring
flange OD had chipped paint from 247-252 degrees with light-to-medium corrosion but no
heat effects. There was light-to-medium corrosion on the forward end ring flange mounting
face and nose inlet ID surface, but it did not extend into the O-ring footprints.
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No separations were observed on the nose inlet assembly or cowl assembly.
4.3.2 Nose Inlet/Throat (Joint 3)
LH
No anomalous conditions were observed. No O-ring or seal surface damage was observed.
RTV was below the char line over the complete circumferencewith slight scalloping below the
char line at 13, 24, and 63 degrees. No gas paths were observed in this joint.
Grease coverage on the joint metal surfaces was nominal. No excessive grease was found in
the bolt holes. Typical light-to-heavy corrosion was observed inboard of the primary O-ring
intermittently full circumference. No other metal damage was observed.
There were no separations observed on the nose inlet assembly. The forward end of the
throat assembly was separated full circumference between metal-to-adhesive with a
maximum radial width of 0.010 inch.
RH
Three anomalous conditions were observed. Gas penetrated into the joint at 211 degrees.
Very light sooting reached the primary O-ring in this area. No O-ring or seal surface damage
was observed.
RTV was below the char line except at 211 degrees. The area of RTV that did not extend
below the char line measured 0.60 inch circumferentially at the char line (3.80 inches
circumferentially maximum) by 0.70 inch radially from the char line. Preliminary PFAR
46C-05 was written against this condition. Associated heat affected CCP was also found at
211 degrees on both the nose inlet and throat joint surfaces with a shallow depth of
approximately 0.005-0.010 inch. Preliminary PFARs 46C-06 and 46C-07 were written
against these observations. Uncured RTV was also observed at 48-80 degrees, 100-114
degrees, and 141-162 degrees.
Grease coverage on the joint metal surfaces was nominal. No excessive grease was found in
the bolt holes. Typical light-to-medium corrosion was observed inboard of the primary
O-ring intermittently full circumference. No other metal damage was observed.
The aft end of the nose inlet assembly was separated full circumference between
adhesive-to-GCP with a maximum radial width of 0.010 inch. There were no separations
observed on the throat assembly.
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4.3.3 Throat/Forward Exit Cone (Joint 4)
LH
No anomalous conditions were observed. No O-ring or seal surface damage was-observed.
RTV was below the char line over the complete circumference of the joint. The RTV reached
the primary O-ring from 0-45 degrees, 83-105 degrees, and 173-300 degrees. No gas paths
were observed in this joint.
Grease coverage on the joint metal surfaces was nominal. No excess grease was found in the
bolt holes. Light-to-medium corrosien was observed intermittently on the inboard 0.070
inch of the throat. The corrosion did not extend into the O-ring footprint. Light burnishing
was found on the throat aft surface. No other metal damage was observed.
Two metal-to-adhesive separations with a maximum radial width of 0.015 inch and one
GCP-to-CCP separation with a maximum radial width of 0.20 inch were observed on the
FEC forward end. The aft end of the throat assembly exhibited a metal-to-adhesive
separation full circumference with a maximum radial width of 0.010 inch.
RH
One anomalous condition was observed. Medium-to-heavy corrosion existed on the
outboard edge of the throat aft surface with the deepest pit, measuring 0.002 inch, located on
the sealing surface at 250-251 degrees. Preliminary PFAR 46C-02 was written against this
condition. No O-ring damage was observed.
RTV was below the char line over the complete circumference of the joint. RTV did not reach
the primary O-ring. No gas paths were observed in this joint.
Grease coverage on the joint metal surfaces was nominal. No excess grease was found in the
bolt holes. Light-to-medium corrosion was also observed on the inboard of the throat aft
surface intermittently with heavy corrosion existing from 162-200 degrees. No other metal
damage was observed.
The aft end of the throat assembly was separated full circumference between metal and the
adhesive with a maximum radial width of 0.010 inch. The forward end of the forward exit cone
also had a metal-to-adhesive separation full circumference with a maximum radial width of
0.100 inch.
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4.3.4 Flex Bearing/Fixed Housing (Joint 5)
LH
No anomalous conditions were observed. No rounded chamfers were observed on the
spoffaces for the Packings with Retainers. All 72 Packings with Retainers had typical
disassembly damage to the elastomer. No O-ring or seal surface damage was observed.
The RTV coverage was nominal. The RTV extended forward intermittently around the full
circumference on the ID of bearing protector inner ring to the flex bearing aft end ring/
bearing protector interface. The RTV did not reach the primary O-ring. Three small voids in
the RTV were found due to the assembly process. No gas paths were observed in this joint.
Grease coverage on the joint metal surfaces was nominal. Intermittently medium-to-heavy
corrosion was observed on the ID aft tip of the aft end ring. No other metal damage was
observed.
There was typical even sooting on the bearing protector and the flex boot ID.
No separations were observed between the inner boot ring and the fixed housing.
RH
No anomalous conditions were observed. No rounded chamfers were observed on the
spotfaces for the Packing with Retainers. Seventy-one out of 72 Packings with Retainers had
typical disassembly damage to the elastomer. Thirty-five out of 72 Packing with Retainers
had radial scratches with raised metal on the retainer and/or gouges in the rubber element.
The damage appeared to have occurred during bolt and/or Packing with Retainer removal.
Preliminary PFAR 46C-03 was written against this condition. No O-ring or seal surface
damage was observed.
The RTV coverage was nominal. The RTV extended to, but not past the primary O-ring from
150-220 and 330-335 degrees. Intermittent voids were observed in the RTV due to the
assembly process. No gas paths were observed in this joint.
Grease coverage on the joint metal surfaces was nominal. No excess grease was found in the
bolt holes. Intermittent medium-to-heavy corrosion was observed on the ID aft tip of the aft
end ring. The heaviest corrosion was located from 160-0-100 degrees. Pit depth was not
measured. Medium corrosion was observed on the secondary seal surface (in the footprint) of
the fixed housing at 323 degrees. The corrosion occurred after splashdown. Several radial
scratches, which could not be felt with a 5-mil brass shim, were observed across the primary
seal surface of the fixed housing at 350 degrees.
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There was typical even sooting on the bearing protector and the flex boot ID.
No separations were observed between the inner boot ring and the fixed housing.
4.3.5 Aft Exit Cone Assembly Bondlines
LH
No anomalous conditions were observed. The primary mode of separation was 61 percent
adhesive-to-GCP, 31 percent within GCP, and 8 percent metal-to-adhesive. The secondary
mode was not recorded. Intermittent small voids (0.10 inch diameter maximum) were
observed throughout the polysulfide.
RH
No anomalous conditions were observed. The primary mode of separation was 52.5 percent
within the GCP, 35 percent adhesive-to-GCP, and 12.5 percent metal-to-adhesive. The
secondary mode was not recorded. Four adhesive voids were documented with a diameter
greater than 0.5 inch. Intermittent small voids (0.10 inch diametermaximum) were observed
throughout the polysulfide.
4.3.6 Forward Exit Cone Assembly Bondlines
LH
No anomalous conditions were observed. The mode of separation was 67.5 percent
adhesive-to-GCP, 27.5 percent metal-to-adhesive, and 5 percent within adhesive.
Medium-to-heavy corrosion was present in areas of the adhesive-to-metal separation.
Seven adhesive voids had a diameter greater than 0.5 inch.
RH
No anomalous conditions were
metal-to-adhesive, 27 percent
observed. The mode of separation was 72 percent
adhesive-to-GCP and 1 percent within the adhesive.
Medium-to-heavy corrosion was present in areas ofthe adhesive-to-metal separation. Four
adhesive voids were found that had a diameter greater than 0.5 inch.
4.3.7 Throat Assembly Bondlines
RH
No anomalous conditions were observed. The throat inlet ring and throat ring mode of
separation was 100 percent metal-to-adhesive. Light-to-heavy corrosion was observed over
the full axial length of throat support housing and full circumference with heavy corrosion
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existing over 65 percent of the surface. Intermittent 'wormhole' voids were found near the aft
end. The largest measured 4.6 inches axially by 17.0 inches circumferentially. Intermittent
voids (less than 0.50 inch diameter) were observed over the entire surface.
No anomalous conditions were observed. The throat inlet ring and throat ring mode of
separation was 63 percent metal-to-adhesive, 31 percent GCP-to-CCP, and 6 percent
adhesive-to-GCP. The secondary mode of separation was 65 percent adhesive-to-GCP and
35 percent metal-to-adhesive. Medium-to-heavy corrosion was present on the throat ring
only at the metal-to-adhesive separation areas. There were two voids that exceeded 0.50
inch in diameter.
4.3.8 Nose Inlet Rings (-503, -504) Bondlines
LH
No anomalous conditions were observed. The mode of separation was 100 percent
metal-to-adhesive. Medium-to-heavy corrosion was present in the areas of the
adhesive-to-metal separation. Two adhesive voids were found that had a diameter greater
than 0.50.
RH
No anomalous conditions were observed. The mode of separation was 100 percent
metal-to-adhesive. Intermittent light-to-medium corrosion was present over the entire
surface. No adhesive voids were found that exceeded 0.50 inch in diameter.
4.3.9 Nose Cap Bondlines
LH
No anomalous condition were observed. The primary mode of separation was 96 percent
GCP-to-CCP and 4 percent metal-to-adhesive. The secondary mode of separation was 67
percent adhesive-to-GCP and 33 percent metal-to-adhesive. Light corrosion was found on
the forward and aft ends. No adhesive voids were found that exceeded 0.50 inch in diameter.
LH
No anomalous conditions were observed. The primary mode of separation was 86 percent
GCP-to-CCP, 8 percent within the GCP, and 6 percent metal-to-adhesive. The secondary
mode of separation was 78 percent adhesive-to-GCP and 22 percent metal-to-adhesive.
Light-to-heavy corrosion was found on the forward end and light-to-medium corrosion was
found on the aft end. Four adhesive voids had a diameter greater than 0.50 inch.
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4.3.10 Cowl Assembly Bondlines
LH
No anomalous conditions were observed. The mode of separation was 100 percent
metal-to-adhesive. Medium corrosion was observed on the bonding surface around the full
circumference. Five adhesive voids had a diameter greater than 0.50 inch.
RH
No anomalous conditions were observed. The mode of separation was 100 percent
metal-to-adhesive. Medium corrosion was observed on the bonding surface around the full
circumference. No adhesive voids were found that had a diameter greater than 0.50 inch.
4.3.11 Fixed Housing Assembly Bondlines
LH
No anomalous conditions were observed. The primary mode of separation was 65 percent
GCP-to-CCP and 35 percent within GCE The secondary mode of separation was 100
percent adhesive-to-GCP. Eight adhesive voids had a diameter greater than 0.50 inch.
Intermittent adhesive voids with diameters of 0.50 inch maximum or smaller were observed
around the circumference. No corrosion was observed on the housing.
RH
No anomalous conditions were observed. The primary mode of separation was 50 percent
within GCP and 50 percent GCP-to-CCP. The secondary failure mode was 100 percent
adhesive-to-GCE Eight adhesive voids had a diameter greater than 0.5 inch. No corrosion
was observed on the housing.
4.3.12 Ultrasonic Inspection of Fixed Housing Assemblies
Ultrasonic inspection was conducted on both of the fixed housing assemblies. The bondlines
appeared nominal with no significant (greater than 1.0 inch diameter) unbonds detected.
Several small (less than 1.0 inch diameter) unbond indications were found on both fixed
housing bondlines.
4.3.13 Char and Erosion Performance
Char and erosion margins of safety are summarized in Table VIII. The char and erosion data
tables for each component liner can be found in Tables D-I through D-XII of Appendix D.
Measurement stations that contain an "N/A? means that data was not available due to missing
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material. The aft exit cone liners were not recovered and therefore are not included. All
stations showed positive margins of safety. The measurement stations can be found in Figure
D-1.
Table VIII. 360T025 Nozzle Char and Erosion Minimum Margins of Safety Summary
Hardware Stations*
Forward Exit Cone Assembly, 1 4 4.6 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 32.9 34
LH 0.29 0.27 0.23 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Forward Exit Cone Assembly, 1 4 4.6 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 32.9 34
RH 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.24 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Throat Assembly, LH 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
0.20 0.22 0.i6 0.12 0.10 0.20 0.28 0.34 0.38 0.29 0.54 0.50
Throat Assembly, RH 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
0.16 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.35 0.37 0.46 0.41
Nose Inlet Rings (-503, -504), 28 30 32 34 36 311 39
LH 0.22 0.39 0.23 0.45 0.39 0.20 0.14
Nose Inlet Rings (-503, -504), 28 30 32 34 36 38 39
RH 0.23 0.33 0.21 0.44 0.42 0.28 0.20
Nose Cap, LH 1.5 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
N/A 0.56 0.67 0.64 0.70 0.87 0.88 0.62 0.59 0.60 0.11 0.01
Nose Cap, RH 1.5 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
N/A 0.58 0.65 0.67 0.72 0.74 0.77 0.72 0.67 0.66 0.26 0.11
Cowl/OBR, LH 0.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 6.8 8 9 10 11.3
0.48 0.34 0.21 0.17 0.26 0.36 0.47 0.42 0.29 0.42 0.60 0.57
Cowl/OBR, RH 0.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 6.8 8 9 10 11.3
0.22 0.29 0.29 0.38 0.40 0.51 0.59 N/A 0.31 0.51 0.54 0.53
Fixed Housing Assembly, LH 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10.75
2.02 0.83 0.72 0.71 0.66 0.61 0.68 0.67 1.19 2.15 N/A
Fixed Housing Assembly, RH 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10.75
2.25 0.86 0.81 0.90 0.93 0.81 0.74 0.80 0.97 2.42 N/A
23
0.29
23
0.21
26
0.05
26
0.23
* Station locations are shown in bold with the margin of safety shown below.
4.3.14 Flex Boot Performance
The performance of both the LH and RH flex boots was nominal. Typical even sooting on
both flexible boot inside diameters was present. Both the LH and RH flex boots had a
minimum of 3.1 NBR plies intact. Positive margins of safety were achieved at all
measurement stations. The flex boot performance margins of safety are summarized in
Table IX.
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Table IX. 360T025 Flex Boot Margins of Safety
Left Hand Right Hand
Degree
LQcation
0
9O
180
270
Max. Perform-
Material ance
Remaining Affected Margin
plieF Depth (in.) of Safety_
3.3 1.30 0.28
3.2 1.34 0.24
3.1 1.37 0.21
3.1 1.37 0.21
Max.
Material
Remaining Affected
Plies Depth (in.)
3.1 1.37
3.3 1.30
3.9 1.11
3.2 1.34
Minimum flex boot overall prefire thickness is 2.5 inches.
Perform-
ance
Margin
of Safety
0.21
0.28
0.50
0.24
4.3.15 Bearing Protector Performance
Close examination showed both of the bearing protectors performed as expected during
flight. Both of the protectors were evenly sooted around the circumference and showed
typically greater erosion in-line with the cowl vent holes. Five areas of heat effects with slight
erosion were found on the RH bearing protector other than at the vent hole locations. The
areas were located from 2.7 inches to 6.5 inches from the aft end of the bearing protector at
162 degrees, 165 degrees, 167 degrees, 180 degrees, and 183 degrees. The maximum erosion
occurred at 165 degrees measuring 0.80 inch axial, 1.40 inch circ., by 0.12 inch in depth. A
corresponding heat affected and slightly eroded area was found at 165 degrees on the flex
boot. Slag fragments were found in the boot cavity. It is believed that slag entering through
the vent holes caused this condition. No indications of soot or heat effects were found on the
ID side of the bearing protector. Preliminary PFAR 46C-08 was written as a result of this
observation. PFOR pg. C-12 shows the post-flight bearing protector thickness measurements
every ten degrees.
4.3.16 Flex Bearing Performance
LH
The flex bearing performance during flight was acceptable. There were no anomalies
associated with flight or splashdown. Examination of the flex bearing revealed no damage,
soot, heat effect, or flow indications. Intermittent areas of snubber segment scuffing were
found on the aft end ring due to splashdown. Intermittent bubbled (unbonded) paint was
found on the flex bearing forward end ring OD at various axial locations around the
circumference. The largest bubble was located at 13 degrees and measured 0.20 inch
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diameter. No corrosion was found under the bubble. Preliminary PFAR 46C-04 was written
as a result of this observation.
RH
No anomalous conditions were observed. The flex bearing performance during flight was
acceptable, with no anomalies reported. Examination of the flex bearing revealed no
damage, Soot, heat effect, or flow indications. Intermittent areas of snubber segment scuffing
were found on the aft end ring due to splashdown.
4.3.17 Throat Diameter
No anomalous conditions were observed. The average LH nozzle postfire throat diameter
was 55.909 inches (erosion rate of 8.4 mils/sec based on an action time of 121.87 sec). The
average RH nozzle postfire throat diameter was 55.992 inches (erosion rate of 8.7 mils/sec
based on an action time of 122.09 sec). RSRM postfire throat diameters have ranged from
55.787 to 56.072 inches.
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4.3.18 Results of Special Issues and Concerns (Nozzle)
identified areas for special evaluation of 360T025 at Clearfield. The nozzle issues are listed
below with their respective results.
1. Condition: Low Density Indications (LDIs) were observed in the GCP of the LH nose
cap from 220-to--260 degrees and at 7.5 to 15.6 inches from the forward end.
X-ray interpretation indicated that these areas were density variations.
Results: After removal of the GCE there was no evidence of the noted LDIs.
2. Condition:
Results:
3. Condition:
Wetline indications were observed in the aft end of the LH fixed housing
GCP and were located 0.25 and 0.40 inch aft of the phenolic O-ring groove.
Circumferential degree locations and length are as follows: 43 degrees, 9.4
inches; 61 degrees, 1.0 inch; 115 degrees, 23.2 inches; 150 degrees, 14.6
inches; 180 degrees, 41.5 inches; 230 degrees, 1.7 inches; 280 degrees, 12.5
inches; 330 degrees, 45.8 inches. These indications were removed at final
assembly level.
A visible resin rich band was observed at 0.40 inch aft of the wiper O-ring
groove at 43-46 degrees and at 0.30 inch aft of the O-ring groove from
330-345 degrees. This corresponds to two of the noted wetline indications.
The other areas at 61 degrees, 115 degrees, 150 degrees, 180 degrees, 230
degrees, and 280 degrees were not found.
Low Density Indications (LDIs) were noted at CCP/GCP interface in the
RH fixed housing insulation. Indications are located 125-to-132 degrees,
1.78 inches from aft tip of the glass. The circumferential extent is 7.11
inches.
Results:
4. Condition:
Results:
No LDIs were observed on the sample.
Bent and broken flex bearing protector forward ring screws have been
observed on flight and static test motors. Exact cause of the damage is under
investigation.
The portion of cowl insulation segments over the screws was removed by
coring over the head of each screw. No bent or broken flex bearing
protector forward ring screws were found on either the LH or RH nozzle.
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